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Abstract
In this paper, we theoretically characterize robust empirically implementable
normative criteria for evaluating socially risky situations. Socially risky situations
are modeled as distributions, among individuals, of lotteries on a nite set of state-
contingent pecuniary consequences. Individuals are assumed to have selsh Von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences for these socially risky situations. We provide
empirically implementable criteria that coincide with the unanimity, over a reason-
ably large class of such individual preferences, of anonymous and Pareto-inclusive
Von Neuman Morgenstern social rankings of risks. The implementable criteria can
be interpreted as sequential expected poverty dominance. An illustration of the use-
fulness of the criteria for comparing the exposure to unemployment risk of di¤erent
segments of the French and US workforce is also provided.
Keywords: Risk, Dominance, ex ante Social Welfare, State-Dependent ex-
pected utility
Expected Utility, Poverty, Unemployment.
JEL classication numbers: C81, D3, D63, D81, I32, J63, J64
1 Introduction
The exposure to risks that societies provide to their members is a clearly important
ingredient for normative evaluation. For instance countries like the US or the UK are
commonly depicted as having "exible" labour markets in which most of the workforce
faces a small probability of involuntary unemployment that, when it happens, receives
little compensation and where the wages of those employed are high. Other countries,
like France, are to the contrary portrayed as having "rigid" labour markets in which a
signicant fraction of the workforce is protected against the risk of involuntary unemploy-
ment even though it enjoys moderate wages, while the remaining part of the workforce
This work has immensely beneted from the comments made by Conchita dAmbrosio, Marc Fleur-
baey, Patrick Moyes, Alain Trannoy and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.
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is exposed to a high probability of unemployment which, if it arises, is the object of
signicant pecuniary compensation. A natural question to ask from a normative point of
view is: what form of organization of the labour market is better? Analogously, one may
be interested in comparing di¤erent countries - or the same country at di¤erent points
in time - on the basis of their distributions of income and exposure to crime, to risks
of health (see e.g. Gravel, Moyes, and Tarroux (2009) or Gravel and Mukhopadhyay
(2010)) or in evaluating various programs of prevention against health or environmental
risks (e.g. Viscusi (2007)).
In this paper, we theoretically justify and empirically implement dominance criteria
that compare allocations of individualsexposure to risks in an ethically robust fashion.
The risks handled by our approach can be described, from the view point of the individual
who faces them, by a nite list of probabilities of occurrence of individual states of nature
(e.g. being unemployed or employed, gravely ill, mildly ill or perfectly healthy, etc.) and
of pecuniary consequences contingent on those states. The risks can also have non-
pecuniary consequences in the sense that the subjective evaluation of a given amount of
money may depend upon the state of nature in which it is received. When risks have
non-pecuniary consequences in this sense, the individual states of nature are assumed to
be unambiguously ordered from the worst (e.g. being gravely ill) to the best (e.g. being
in perfect health).
At rst sight, normative comparisons of distributions of individual exposure to risk
can be seen as particular instances of general multi-dimensional normative evaluation
(see e.g. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Kolm (1977)). After all the probability of
being unemployed, falling ill, being the victim of a crime, etc. can be viewed as individual
attributes whose distributions, along with that of income, can be evaluated by general
multi-dimensional dominance tools of the Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) variety (see
e.g. Gravel, Moyes, and Tarroux (2009) or Gravel and Mukhopadhyay (2010)). Yet the
particular structure imposed by the fact that the attributes are individual probabilities
of falling in alternative states turns out, when interpreted through standard decision the-
ory, to a¤ect signicantly the nature of the evaluative exercise. As will be seen indeed,
the criteria that we obtain are quite di¤erent from the abstract rst or second order
multi-dimensional stochastic dominance criteria à la Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982).
However, and as discussed below, they bear a formal similarity with the two-dimensional
dominance criteria developed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) and Jenkins and Lam-
bert (1993) for ranking distributions of income between households di¤ering by their need.
We assume that individuals have (possibly state-dependent)Von Neumann-Morgenstern
(VNM) preferences over these risks. Acknowledging that a distribution of these individual
risks can be seen as a socially risky situation (using Fleurbaey (2010) terminology), we
obtain empirically implementable criteria for comparing these socially risky situations
that coincide with the unanimity, taken over a reasonably large class of such individual
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VNM preferences, of all Pareto consistent and anonymous VNM social rankings. As
a result of a version of Harsanyi (1955)s aggregation theorem due to Weymark (1991),
it happens that any such ranking of socially risky situations can be numerically repre-
sented as the unweighted sum of the individualsexpected utility functions. If the social
ranking is required to satisfy an anonymity requirement, and individual preferences are
selsh, then these individuals expected utility functions are all identical. Within this
framework, we characterize two implementable criteria that correspond to di¤erent sets
of assumptions made on these individual expected utility functions.
We rst consider the class of individual VNM preferences that are represented by
an expected utility function that exhibits a positive marginal utility of income that is
decreasing with respect to the individual states (ordered from the worst to the best). We
show that the empirically implementable criterion that coincides with the unanimity, over
this class of individual preferences, of all Pareto inclusive, anonymous and VNM social
preferences is what we call "Sequential Expected Headcount Poverty" (SEHP) dominance.
This criterion ranks a socially risky situation A weakly above a socially risky situation
B if, for any poverty line and any state, the expected number of individuals who are
both below the line and in a worse state is no greater in A than in B. The sequential
aspect of the criterion arises from the fact that in order to check for dominance, one looks
rst at expected number of poor in the worst state and, in a second step, at the total
expected number of poor in the two worst states, and so on, in a sequential fashion. To
that extent, this criterion may be viewed as giving a priority to poverty that is decreasing
with the states. This reects of course the assumption that the marginal utility of income
is decreasing with respect to states, an assumption that may be at odds with empirical
evidence (see e.g. Viscusi and Evans (1990)).
The second, more restricted, family of VNM preferences is made of those preferences
that satisfy, in addition, the property of risk aversion (the marginal utility of income
is decreasing with income in every state) and the (somewhat more contentious) condi-
tion that the decrease in the marginal utility of income with respect to income be itself
decreasing with respect to the states. This later condition is implied by, but is not equiv-
alent to, the requirement that the degree of absolute risk aversion, as measured by the
Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient, be decreasing with the states. We show that the implementable
criterion that coincides with the unanimity, taken over all individual VNM preferences
in this class, of all rankings produced by a Pareto-inclusive and anonymous VNM social
preference is what we call "Sequential Expected Poverty Gap" (SEPG) dominance. This
criterion works just like the SEHP one, but with poverty gap, rather than headcount
poverty, used as the poverty measure.
We also illustrate the usefulness of our criteria for comparing the distributions of risks
of unemployment in France and in the US. We specically show that our criteria do not
enable one to rank US and France in terms of their allocation of unemployment risks.
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The empirical illustration reveals also that, in France, male adults are better protected
against the risk of unemployment than female ones while no such dominance of males
over females is observed in the US. This suggests therefore that the male-female gap in
protection against unemployment risks is higher in France than in the US. The analysis
also reveals that young segments of the workforce have worse exposure to unemployment
risks than older ones, but that this advantage of the old over the young is somewhat lower
in the US than in France.
The plan of the remaining of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the
normative and empirically implementable criteria and establishes the formal equivalence
between them. The third section applies the criteria to the US-France comparisons of the
distribution of risks of involuntary unemployment. The fourth section concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Normative criteria
We consider societies made of a given number, n say, of individuals1, indexed by i, with
i 2 N = f1; :::; ng. Societies expose their individual members to risks of falling into
a nite number, l say, of mutually exclusive individual states indexed by j and taken
from some set 
 = f1; :::; lg. We admit the possibility that individuals attach intrinsic
value to the state in which they fall (as they may, for instance, prefer receiving a given
amount of income while being healthy than while being ill). We do this by assuming
that these individual states are ordered from the worst (state 1) to the best (state l).
In addition to their intrinsic appeal, individual states are also valued for the pecuniary
consequences (incomes) that the individual may get contingent upon them. In order to
keep the formalism simple, we assume that the set I of all conceivable income levels is
nite and can be written as I = f0; :::;mg for some (possibly large) integer m. Income
is therefore assumed to be available in non-negative integer quantities (say in cents).
Like Fleurbaey (2010), we call socially risky situation a specic pattern of individuals
exposures to risks. Formally, and somewhat di¤erently than Fleurbaey (2010), we model
a socially risky situation as a probability distribution - or lottery   p on the set X =
(
  I)n of all logically conceivable n-tuples of individual state-income pairs, one such
pair for every individual.2 A typical element x of X writes:
x = (jx1 ; y
x
1 ; :::; j
x
n; y
x
n) (1)
1The generalization to societies involving di¤erent numbers of individuals is immediate.
2In Fleurbaey (2010) socially risky situations are described as probability distributions over proles
of VNM utility levels. The restriction of the analysis to a nite set X is a pedagogical simplication that
enables us to use the version of Harsanyi social aggregation theorem provided by Weymark (1991) as a
theoretical justication to our criteria.
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where, for i = 1; :::; n, jxi 2 
 denotes the individual state in which individual i falls
in the social state x and yxi 2 I denotes is income in that social state. In this nite
framework, a lottery p is just an element of the (lm)n   1 dimensional simplex, the xth
component of which, denoted px, being interpreted as the probability that the society
falls into x under the socially risky situation p. We abuse notation and, for any x 2 X,
we denote simply by x the "non-risky" socially risky situation that assigns a probability
one to social state x and a probability 0 to any other social state. We denote by L the
set of all lotteries on X.
Every individual i 2 N is assumed to have a selsh VNM preference ordering3 %i on
L, with asymmetric and symmetric factors i and i respectively. This means that there
exists a function Ui : (
 I)! R such that, for every socially risky situation p and q in
L, one has:
p %i q ,
X
x2X
pxUi(j
x
i ; y
x
i ) 
X
x2X
qxUi(j
x
i ; y
x
i ). (2)
As we shall be concerned by anonymous social preference, we shall in fact assume that
these functions Ui are the same for all individuals. Socially risky situations in L are
normatively evaluated by a social ordering % that can be dened by:
p % q ,
X
x2X
px
X
i2N
U(jxi ; y
x
i ) 
X
x2X
qx
X
i2N
U(jxi ; y
x
i ) (3)
for some (common to all individuals) function U : 
  I! R. There are many ways by
which one could justify a ranking of socially risky situations having such a utilitarian-like
form. The one that we favour appeals to the well-known Harsanyi (1955) aggregation
theorem. It is indeed not di¢ cult to establish that any VNM ranking of socially risky
situations that respect - in the Pareto sense - the individual selsh VNM preferences
and that is anonymous will be represented as per (3) for some utility function U whose
expectation represented every individual VNM preferences.
Each criterion proposed in this paper will be shown to rank lotteries in L in a way
that coincides with the unanimity of all social orderings that can be written as per (3)
for some individual utility function U taken from some (reasonably large) class. We call
"normative dominance" any such criterion that is dened as follows.
Denition 1 (Normative dominance) Socially risky situation p normatively domi-
nates socially risky situation q for a class U of functions U : 
 I! R, denoted p %U q,
if inequality (3) holds for all functions U in the class.
In the current paper, we apply this denition of normative dominance to two specic
classes of state-dependent preferences. In order to dene formally these classes in the dis-
3An ordering is a reexive, complete and transitive binary relation.
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crete setting considered herein, we rst introduce the following properties of the expected
utility representation of such state-dependent VNM preferences.
P1 For every state j = 1; :::; l   1, one has:
(i) U(j; y)  U(j + 1; y) for every income y 2 f1; :::;mg and,
(ii) 0 < U(j + 1; y + 1)   U(j + 1; y)  U(j; y + 1)   U(j; y) for every income y
2 f1; :::;m  1g.
P2 For every state j = 1; :::; l   1 and income y 2 f1; :::;m  2g, one has:
0  U(j+1; y+2) 2U(j+1; y+1)+U(j+1; y)  U(j; y+2) 2U(j; y+1)+U(j; y)
We denote by U1 the class of all state-dependent utility functions satisfying property
P1 and by U2 the (more restricted) class of such utility functions who satisfy both P1
and P2.
An individual with VNM preferences whose expected utility representation uses a
function in U1 prefers being for sure in a better state than in a worse one (given income),
prefers receiving more income to less (given the state), and values more an additional
unit of income enjoyed for sure in a bad state than in a good one. Preferences that are
represented by an expectation of a utility function in U2 exhibit, in addition, risk aversion
(the marginal utility of income decreases with respect to income in any state) as well as
the requirement that the decrease in marginal utility of income be itself decreasing with
respect to the individual state.
For a strictly risk averse preference4 satisfying P1, it can be checked easily that the
latter property is implied by the requirement that absolute risk aversion - as measured
by the (discrete) Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient5 - is decreasing with the state. On the other
hand, assumption P2 does not imply that risk aversion is decreasing across states. For
instance, if l = 2, the function U : f1; 2g  I dened by:
U(j; y) = 1  (3  j)e 3j 1y (4)
satises P1 and P2 (the (continuous) graphs of U(1; y) = 1 2e y and U(2; y) = 1 e 3y
are depicted on gure 1).
4A VNM preference is strictly risk averse if the function U whose expectation numerically represents
it satises, for every j 2 
 and y 2 f1; :::;m  2g, U(j; y + 2)  2U(j; y + 1) + U(j; y) < 0.
5For the individual state j and the income level y, the discrete Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient is the number
a(j; y) dened by:
a(j; y) =
 [U(j; y + 2)  2U(j; y + 1) + U(j; y)]
U(j; y + 1)  U(j; y)
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Figure 1
However:
a(1; y) =
 [ 2e (y+2) + 4e (y+1)   2e y)]
( 2e (y+1) + 2e y)
=
e 2   2e 1 + 1
 e 1 + 1  0; 63212
< 0:95021  e
 6   2e 3 + 1
 e 3 + 1
=
 [ e 3(y+2) + 2e 3(y+1)   e 3y]
 e 3(y+1) + e 3y
= a(2; y)
so that the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of risk aversion of an individual with VNM preference
represented by (4) is increasing with the state.
While the requirement that VNM preferences be increasing with respect to the state
or the income for sure or be risk averse are standard and somewhat plausible, we recognize
that the two other properties may not be. Consider rst the property that the marginal
utility of income be decreasing with respect to the state. When interpreted in a health
context, it implies that an individual who could purchase health insurance at an actuari-
ally fair premium would choose to over insure herself. Indeed, consider a two-state world
(
 = f1; 2g) and a household endowed with an income of y exposed to a probability  of
having a health problem that can be insured at an actuarially fair premium of r = 
1  .
Assuming that the health problem, if it arises, generates a nancial loss of L, one can
write the optimal insurance purchase decision of that individual as:
max
I0
(1  )U(2; w   I
1   ) + U(1; w   L+ I)
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Because any purchase of a strictly positive amount I of insurance will satisfy the rst
order condition of this program6, one would have:
@U(2; w   I

1   )=@y = @U(1; w   L+ I
)=@y
For this equality to hold given the assumed property of U one must have w L+I  w 
I
1  and, therefore I
  (1 )L. Hence an individual with VNM preferences represented
by the expectation of a utility function satisfying P1 who has access to actuarially fair
health insurance would choose to purchase more insurance than the expected nancial
loss incurred in case of a health problem. There seems to be some empirical evidence (see
e.g. Viscusi and Evans (1990)) that such a behavior is not plausible. We are not aware of
empirical evidence in favour of (or against) the property of decreasing risk aversion with
respect to the state or of its implication in terms of P2.
We nally emphasize that, while the implementable criteria proposed in the next
section of this paper are based on these properties, the approach is exible. Other imple-
mentable criteria could possibly be produced by considering alternative sets of assump-
tions on VNM preferences.
2.2 The criteria and their characterization
For a socially risky situation p 2 L, we let p(i; j; y) be the probability that individual i
ends up in individual state j with income y in that socially risky situation. This probability
is dened by:
p(i; j; y) =
X
fx2X:jxi =j, yxi =yg
px (5)
With this notation, we rst introduce the Sequential Expected Headcount Poverty
(SEHP) dominance criterion.
Denition 2 (Sequential Expected Headcount Poverty dominance) For p and q 2
L, we say that p SEHP dominates q, denoted p %SEHP q if, for every poverty line t 2 I
and every state k 2 
, one has:X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
p(i; j; y) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
q(i; j; y) (6)
In words, socially risky situation p dominates socially risky situation q for the SEHP
criterion if, for every state k and monetary poverty line t, the expected numbers of in-
dividuals who are both in a weakly worse state and poor is no greater in p than in q.
As the SEHP criterion requires inequality (6) to hold for every poverty line, it implies,
6We are cheating a bit here with respect to the discrete setting in which the rest of the analysis is
conducted by considering a di¤erentiable framework.
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by choosing a large enough poverty line, that, for every state k, the expected number of
individuals in states weakly worse than k be no greater in the dominating situation than
in the dominated one. In the same spirit, since the SEHP criterion requires inequality (6)
to holds for k = l, it implies the expected number of poor irrespective of the state to be no
greater in the dominating situation than in the dominated one. Notice that requiring the
expected number of poor irrespective of the state to be lower in the dominating situation
is not equivalent to requiring the same relationship to hold for the total number of poor
irrespective of the state. The only instance where the two requirements could coincide
would be a socially risky situation in which the income received by an individual is the
same in all states.
The second implementable criterion is the analogue of SEHP dominance, but with
poverty gap, rather than headcount poverty, used as a measure of poverty. We call it,
for this reason, the Sequential Expected Poverty Gap (SEPG) criterion. In order to dene
this criterion, we denote by P (t; y) the poverty gap of income y for the poverty line t
dened by:
P (t; y) = max[t  y; 0] (7)
This poverty gap is, as usual, interpreted to be the minimal amount of income required to
get a person with income of y out of poverty when the poverty line is t. We accordingly
dene the SEPG criterion as follows.
Denition 3 (Sequential Expected Poverty Gap dominance) For p and q 2 L,
we say that p SEPG dominates q, denoted p %SEPG q if, for every poverty line t 2 I and
every state k 2 
, one has:X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
p(i; j; y)P (t; y) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
q(i; j; y)P (t; y) (8)
and, for every state k, it is the case that:X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
p(i; j; y) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
q(i; j; y) (9)
In words, socially risky situation p dominates socially risky situation q for the SEPG
criterion if, for every poverty line and every state, the expected amount of money required
to eliminate poverty in all weakly worse states is lower in p than in q (condition (8)) and if
the expected number of individuals who are in a weakly worse state is also weakly smaller
in p than in q (condition (9)). It should be noticed that requirement (9) must be added
to the denition of the criterion rather than being deduced, as was the case for the SEHP
criterion, from the single inequality (8). As can be checked from the proof of theorem 2
in appendix A, the additional requirement (9) can be dispensed with if one assumes the
existence of a su¢ ciently high income level for which an individual is indi¤erent between
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states. We must admit that we nd this assumption rather implausible. After all, even
arbitrarily rich individuals experience utility loss when they are raped or severely injured.
We notice that the SEHP and SEPG criteria can be viewed as dominance criteria
made on specic members of the class of "vulnerability to poverty" measures discussed
in Dutta, Foster, and Mishra (2011). This is at least true for the SEPG criterion (as the
SEHP criterion does not ride on a measure of "vulnerability to poverty" that belongs to
the class characterized in Dutta, Foster, and Mishra (2011)).
We notice also that the SEPG dominance criterion is, from a formal point of view,
similar to the one proposed by Bazen and Moyes (2003) for comparing distributions of
incomes between households with di¤ering needs (or abilities). In the need approach,
one compares distributions, between n households (individuals) of pairs (ji; yi) (for i =
1; :::; n) where ji is an (ordinal) index of is ability and yi is a (cardinally meaningful)
measure of is income. Ability levels can only take up nitely many values and look
therefore very much like the individuals "states" of the current approach.7 From an
abstract view point, one may indeed view the fact, for a given individual, of belonging
to a given "need category" to be the ex post result of a socially risky situation. For
any distribution d of ability and income levels, one can denote by fd(j; y) the (possibly
null) fraction of the population who have both ability j and income y in that distribution.
Bazen and Moyes (2003) (see their proposition 4.1) have proposed, as a variant of Jenkins
and Lambert (1993) generalization of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) sequential Lorenz
criterion, to rank a distribution d above a distribution d0 if and only if it is the case that,
for every ability level k 2 f1; :::; lg:
kX
j=1
X
y2I
fd(j; y)P (t; y) 
kX
j=1
X
y2I
fd
0
(j; y)P (t; y) (10)
for every poverty line t and:
kX
j=1
X
y2I
fd(j; y) 
kX
j=1
X
y2I
fd0(j; y) (11)
Inequalities (10) and (11) are clearly obtained from inequalities (8) and (9) that dene
SEPG dominance by simply setting:
fd(j; y) =
X
i2N
p(i; j; y)=n
7However, the need literature typically assumes that incomes are available in any (real) quantity
whatsoever. This di¤erence with the current setting is not essential.
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and:
fd
0
(j; y) =
X
i2N
q(i; j; y)=n
Hence, the Bazen-Moyes or Jenkins-Lambert criteria can be said to be implied by the
SEPG criterion if the observed frequency fd(j; y) of the population in state j and in
income y turns out to coincide precisely with its expectation
X
i2N
q(i; j; y)=n. Yet there is
no reason for such a precise coincidence to hold. The "need approach" is, in e¤ect, an
ex post approach that compares distributions of outcomes after the uncertainty has been
resolved and the individuals have been assigned to their nal "need category-income" pair.
The current analysis, on the other hand, looks at things from an ex ante perspective, and
focuses on the distributions of risks before the uncertainty has been resolved.
In order to make that point clear, let us consider the following two-agents (N = f1;2g)
two-states 
 = f1;2g illustration. Restrict attention to social states where individual 1
earns 3 in the bad state 1 and earns 4 in the good state 2 while individual 2 earns 0:5 in
the bad state and 2 in the good state (all other social states receiving zero probabilities).
Consider specically the socially risky situations p and q dened by:
p(1;3;2;2) = 1=2
= p(2;4;1;0:5)
and px = 0 for all other social states x 2 (f1; 2g  I)n and:
q(1;3;1;1=2) = 1=2
= q(2;4;2;2)
and qx = 0 for all other x 2 (f1; 2g  I)n. Notice that the two individuals face ex ante
the same probability of being unemployed (and of getting their income contingent upon
this status) in the two socially risky situations. Because of this, p and q are considered
equivalent by either the SEHP or the SEPG criterion. What would be the verdict of the
ex post need analysis ? This depends of course upon which of the two outcome arises in
each of the two social lotteries. There are really only four possibilities here (all equally
probable if the two socially risky situations are independent):
outcome (1; 3; 2; 2) arises in p and outcome (1; 3; 1; 1=2) arises in q (12)
outcome (1; 3; 2; 2) arises in p and outcome (2; 4; 2; 2) arises in q (13)
outcome (2; 4; 1; 1=2) arises in p and outcome (1; 3; 1; 1=2) arises in q (14)
outcome (2; 4; 1; 1=2) arises in p and outcome (2; 4; 2; 2) arises in q (15)
Applying the Bazen-Moyes-Jenkins-Lambert criterion to the comparisons of the two out-
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comes in each of the cases (12)-(15) yields a strict dominance of the ex post result of p
over that of q in cases (12) and (14) and the reverse conclusion of a strict dominance of
the ex post result of q over p in cases (13) and (15). Hence the comparisons of two par-
ticular ex post realizations of two socially risky situations do not provide much guidance
for the ex ante comparison of these two situations.
We conclude this subsection by providing a normative foundation for each of these
two criteria. More specically, we show that each criterion coincides with the ranking
of socially risky situations that commands unanimity over all anonymous, Paretian and
VNM social rankings who assume that individual VNM preferences can be represented
by expected utility functions in one the two classes dened above. The proofs of these
two results, that are straightforward and use standard (discrete) integration by part
arguments, have been relegated in the appendix.
The rst theorem establishes the equivalence between normative dominance for the
class U1 and SEHP dominance.
Theorem 1 Let p and q be two socially risky situations in L. Then p %U1 q if and only
if p %SEHP q.
The second theorem establishes the equivalence between normative dominance over
the class U2 and sequential expected poverty gap dominance.
Theorem 2 Let p and q be two socially risky situations in L. Then p %U2 q if and only
if p %SEPG q.
3 Empirical illustration
We now illustrate how the implementable criteria proposed in the preceding section can
generate interesting empirical conclusions. Our illustration is made using sample data. In
order to derive from these sample data conclusions that are valid for the populations rep-
resented by the samples, we perform statistical inference based on the Union-Intersection
(UI) method as initiated by Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1989)8. The UI method asserts
that one does not reject the hypothesis of dominance of a socially risky situation p over
a socially risky situation q when none of the poverty di¤erences that dene the domi-
nance criterion is signicantly positive and at least one of them is signicantly negative.
The statistical inference methodology used in this paper is very close to the one used in
8See Howes (1994) for a critical appraisal of this inference methodology, that can be contrasted with
another, more conservative, Intersection-Union (IU) one.
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Gravel, Moyes, and Tarroux (2009) and we refer to that paper for further details. All
comparisons presented herein are performed at the 95% condence level.
Our illustration concerns the labour market in France and in the US.9 Risks of job
loss remain obviously a major concern for billions of individuals all over the world. This
concern has fueled a literature that attempts at empirically measuring the phenomenon
in various western countries. For the United States, authors like Farber (2004), have
suggested that the average job insecurity in the US has increased mildly in the late
nineties while others, like Gottschalk and Mo¢ t (1999), have shown no evidence of an
increase in the probability of loosing ones job. There has been also some papers that
have examined the evolution of the average risk of involuntary job loss in France. For
instance, Givord and Maurin (2004) suggests that the probability of involuntary job loss
has increased since the 1980s. It has also been noticed by Postel-Vinay (2003) that the
increase in the risk of loosing ones job has been larger for low-seniority workers than
for high-seniority ones. These studies have focused on the average probability of being
unemployed and have not derived meaningful normative conclusion out of their analysis.
The criteria of the previous section are potentially useful for this purpose.
We illustrate this by comparing exposures to unemployment risks of single adult mem-
bers of the workforce between US and France. We focus on single adults to avoid nor-
matively challenging issues that concern multi-individual households. We use the French
labour Force Survey (LFS) and the US Current Population Survey-March Supplement
(CPS-MS) for both 2003 and 2004. The LFS contains 50,524 respondents (employees
and unemployed), 6,953 of which being single individuals without children. In the US
CPS, the number of respondents is 90,314 (employees and unemployed) and the number
of those who are single without children is 7,523. In both data sets, the same individuals
are observed in 2003 and 2004. The fact that some of them have experienced change
in employment status between the two years enables us to assign to each individual a
probability of being unemployed, an income if employed and a (substitution) income if
unemployed.
Consider rst the probability of unemployment. This probability means di¤erent
things for di¤erent individuals. For an individual observed unemployed in 2003, this
probability is the probability of remaining unemployed in 2004. For an individual ob-
served employed in 2003, it is the probability of loosing his or her job between 2003 and
2004. We assign probabilities to individuals by grouping them into homogeneous groups
with respect to observable characteristics and by assigning to each individual of the group
the same probability of unemployment. We formed 38 groups of individuals who were
employed in 2003 (according to their level of education, activity sector, age and the fact
that they work in the private or the public sector) and 10 groups of unemployed individ-
9Another empirical use of the criteria developed in this paper to understand the evolution of the
exposures of Indian citizens to risks of death is provided in Gravel, Mukhopadhyay, and Tarroux (2008).
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uals (dened on the basis of education, unemployment seniority and gender). While the
French LFS distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary unemployment, the CPS
does not. Hence, we adjusted our estimated risks in the US by using the Displaced
Workers Survey (DWS). The DWS is conducted in January only on the same sample
of individuals used in the CPS. It asks workers whether or not they were involuntary
displaced from a job at any time in the preceding three-year period. We use the DWS to
estimate the fraction of unemployed individuals who have been involuntary put into that
situation.
As for the activity income, we have assigned to every individual employed in 2003
the observed income of this individual provided by the data. For an individual observed
unemployed in 2003, we assign to him or her the monthly labour income he or she
would have earned had he or she been employed. In order to assign this income, we
estimate a wage equation on the sample of employed individuals. We of course account
for the possible selection bias that could arise from the fact that we assign to unemployed
individuals a wage that has been estimated on a sample of employed households by using
Heckman (1979)s methodology. The independent variables used in the wage equation
are seniority (dummy), occupations (6 dummies), industries (5 dummies), city size (10
dummies for France and 8 for United States), education level (6 dummies), age and
age squared. The independent variables used in the selection equation of the Heckman
procedure - the fact of being employed - are, in addition to those, the number of children
between 6 and 18, the number of children below 6 and dummy variables of the marital
status (divorced and widows). We have performed the estimation separately for the
samples of female and male singles. The activity income obtained is then transformed
for all individuals into disposable income by subtracting income taxes (net of possible
income tax credit) and by adding welfare payments, if any.
Finally, we assign to each individual a replacement income received in case of unem-
ployment on the basis of the legislation in the two countries. This substitution income is
principally made of unemployment benets and/or social welfare payments. Unemploy-
ment benets are function of the past activity income and the intensity of work (full/part
time). Unemployment benets are more generous in France (where they can last for one
year) than in US (where they do not go beyond 26 weeks). In France the only con-
sidered welfare payment is the Revenu Minimum dInsertion (RMI) (about $400 US a
month) that works like a minimal income. Since much welfare payments in the US are
given to family with at least one child, we ignore these benets in this study devoted to
single adults. Other welfare payments like Housing benets ("Allocation Personnalisée
au Logement" and "Allocation Logement" in France, and Low-Rent Public Housing and
Housing Choice Vouchers in the US) are also ignored because we do not have information
on housing prices.
Summary statistics on probability estimates and average activity and replacement
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incomes are provided in table 2. All pecuniary gures are in US dollars corrected for
purchasing power parity.
As can be seen, the probability of being (becoming or remaining) employed is both
higher and more equally distributed amongst single workers in the US than in France.
Notice that this appears to be true only for those individuals who were unemployed in
2003, as unemployment inertia is stronger in France than in the US. Among the employed
individuals, there does not seem to be much di¤erence between the probability of keeping
ones job for one year in France (95.99 %) and in the US (95.51 %). This however seems to
be specic to the population of single adults without children. The other estimations that
we have done for the two populations suggest that, if we include the other members of
the workforce, the probability of keeping ones job is also signicantly higher in US than
in France. Moreover France seems also to be more "unequal" than in the US in terms
of the way it distributes the probability of keeping ones job across its single adults. The
gap in average probability of good state is larger between women and men and between
"old" (above thirty) and "young" workers in France than in the United States. We
can also note that women seem to face, in both countries, a lower probability of being
unemployed. This can be explained in part by the fact that there is a larger proportion
of women working in the less risky public sector.
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France United States
Probability of employment (%) 88.67 93.84
(19.88) (12.74)
Female 89.66 94.64
(18.68) (12.17)
Male 87.90 93.13
(20.74) (13.18)
<30 old 87.08 93.66
(19.32) (12.33)
>30 old 89.4 93.90
(20.10) (12.87)
Probability of remaining employed 95.99 95.51
(3.97) (9.45)
Probability of becoming employed 39.93 69.68
(13.81) (24.33)
Monthly income (PPP $)
Mean income in employment 1,284 2,508
(685.28) (2428)
Mean replacement income 885 856
(564.05) (362.81)
Table 2: summary statistics, France USA
As a benchmark for the analysis conducted in this section, we show in Figure 3a and 3b
the conventional one-dimensional poverty gap curves for men and women in the US and
in France. These curves are drawn by considering, on the horizontal axis, the individual
monthly income (net of taxes and transfers) as observed in 2003 without taking into
account the employment status of the individual. To that extent, and referring back to
the discussion of the previous section, these curves are drawn ex-post after the assignment
of individuals to their employment status. The verication that one of these two curves
lies everywhere below the other would correspond to the second step of Jenkins and
Lambert (1993) or Bazen and Moyes (2003) procedure (the rst stage being the drawing
of these two curves on the sole population of unemployed). As can be seen, except for very
small poverty lines (see gure 3a), the amount of income that is required for eliminating
poverty tends to be much larger in France than in the US. Non surprisingly, the within-
country ranking of the men and women subsamples (favorable to men) is the same in the
two countries. di¤er somewhat in the two countries. In France, and with the exception
of relatively high income thresholds, the fraction of women who are poorer than any
threshold is larger than the corresponding fraction for men, even for very low poverty
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lines. In the US, this (headcount) poverty dominance of men over women is not observed
for very low incomes. Hence, in the US, men tend to be more a¤ected by severe poverty
than women while the converse is true in France.
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Figure 3a: Conventional expected poverty gap curves for low income
individuals.
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Figure 3b: Conventional poverty gap curves for the whole population.
We now compare the two countries using our ex ante SEHP and SEPG criteria. Doing
this requires us to order the two states of nature that dene employment status. There
are really only three possibilities here:
1) unemployment is intrinsically worse than employment,
2) unemployment is intrinsically better than employment and,
3) unemployment risks have only pecuniary consequences so that none of the two
states is intrinsically better than the other.
The rst possibility corresponds to a widespread view, supported by some empirical
evidence (see e.g. Clark and Oswald (1994)), that unemployment has important adverse
non-pecuniary consequences (social stigma, loss of self-esteem, etc.) that outweigh the
possible non-pecuniary benet associated to the extra leisure time that it provides. The
second possibility reects the converse belief that the non pecuniary benet of leisure
time dominates the non-pecuniary cost of unemployment. The third possibility assumes
that non-pecuniary negative and positive consequences of unemployment either cancel
out each other or that their net e¤ect is su¢ ciently small as compared to the pecuniary
consequences that they can be neglected for all practical purposes. As we do not want
to take any rm stance as to which of the three possibilities is the more likely, we apply
the criteria to each of them in turn.
Figures 4a, 4b and 4c provide expected poverty gap curves in the unemployment state,
the employment state and in either state respectively for the total adult population of
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the two countries as well as the male and female subsamples. Recall from the denition
of SEPG dominance that non-crossing of two curves in gures 4a and 4c is required
if unemployment is considered to be a worse state than employment (rst possibility).
If the second possibility is considered, then non-crossing of two curves in gures 4b
and 4c is required. Finally, if one assumes that unemployment risk has only pecuniary
consequences, then the criterion that applies in that case only requires non-crossing of
the two curves in gure 4c. It can be noticed that the ex ante poverty curves shown in
gure 4c (used in the second stage of our SEPG criterion) are di¤erent from the ex post
ones shown in gure 3b, which would be used in the second stage of an analysis à la
Bazen and Moyes (2003) or Jenkins and Lambert (1993). Particularly important is the
di¤erence concerning the within-country comparisons of these curves for the male and
female populations.
Expected poverty gap in the unemployment state
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Figure 4a
Since a crossing of any two curves on gure 4c is su¢ cient to block a dominance verdict
for any of the three orderings, it is clear that, irrespective of the population considered -
male, female or the whole - there is no dominance between France and the US. As appears
clearly on gure 4c, the French curves lie below their US counterparts for very low levels
of income (less than $900 a month) while they lie above for the rest of the distribution.
This crossing of the curves at $900 happens of course because of the protection provided
to extremely poor workers in France by the RMI, a protection that is not present in the
US. Of course, only statistical testing can determines if di¤erences and crossing between
curves are signicant.
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Expected Poverty Gap in the employment state
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Figure 4b
Expected Poverty Gap in either state
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Figure 4c
Interesting also, especially in view of what was suggested by gures 3a and 3b, are
the comparisons of the male and female curves within each country. In the US, expected
poverty gap irrespective of the state is higher for women than for men at the upper tail of
the distribution but lower at the bottom part of it. On the other hand, if one concentrates
on unemployed individuals, expected poverty gap is everywhere lower for women than for
men. The situation is di¤erent in France where expected poverty gap irrespective of the
state is lower for men than for women both in the unemployed state and irrespective of
the states. Hence, while men seem to be robustly more protected against unemployment
risk than women in France, no such dominance arises in the US. In this sense, it can be
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said that the men-women gap in terms of protection against unemployment risks is lower
in the US than in France.
Table 3 shows the results of the comparisons, on the basis of the expected poverty gap
criteria, of the above populations for all three orderings of the states based on statistical
inference, rather than visual inspection of graphs. The table also shows the results of the
comparisons, within each country, of young and old segments
Comparison Min Max degree of critical
SEPG Ranking t t freedom t
FRANCE-US
unemployment is bad ? -18.07 63.32 (396,1) 3.95
employment is bad ? -18.07 63.32 (403,1) 3.96
state independent ? -18.07 63.32 (201,1) 3.66
FRANCE
Fem.-Male, unemployment is bad ? -3.71 9.57 (158,1) 3.59
Fem-Male, employment is bad Male -1.07 10.77 (179,1) 3.63
Fem-Male, state independent Male 2.2 9.57 (89,1) 3.44
Young-old, unemployment is bad OLD 4.67 12.38 (157,1) 3.59
Young-old, employment is bad ? -4.43 12.38 (179,1) 3.63
Young-old, state independent OLD 6.37 12.38 (89,1) 3.44
US
Fem-Male, unemployment is bad ? -17.43 5.63 (203,1) 3.66
Fem-Male, employment is bad ? -10.83 9.2 (361,1) 3.9
Fem-Male, state independent ? -10.83 5.63 (180,1) 3.63
Old-Young, unemployment is bad OLD -1.96 14.65 (203,1) 3.66
Old-Young, employment is bad OLD 3.36 14.65 (361,1) 3.9
Old-Young, state independent OLD 1.7 14.65 (180,1) 3.63
Table 3: SEPG comparisons
of the single adults sample (irrespective of gender), with 30 years old as the cut-o¤ age.
Table 3 thus reinforces the impression, provided by gures 4a-c, on the France-US
di¤erences with respect to the way they expose their adult males and females to un-
employment risks. Except when unemployment is assumed to be the worst state, the
exposure of French male adults to unemployment risks is better than that of female.
Moreover, the failure to achieve dominance of male over female in the case where un-
employment is the worse state only comes from the fact that average unemployment is
lower in France for females than for males (remember that condition (9) must hold in
order to have SEPG dominance). Yet, if one is willing to assume that, for very high
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income, there is no utility di¤erence between being unemployed and being employed - a
reasonable assumption for unemployment - then one would conclude that French men are
better protected than French women against unemployment risks. Table 3 also reveals
that, as can be expected, the old segment of the adult population is, in both countries,
better protected against unemployment risks than the young segment. As it turns out,
this result holds even if one uses the more robust SEHP criterion. Notice that, in the case
of France, the dominance of old adults over young ones does not hold if one assumes that
employment is a worse state than unemployment at a given income level. The reason for
this dominance failure comes, here again, from the failure to satisfy condition (9) (the
probability of being employed is signicantly higher in France among the old than among
the young).
4 Conclusion
This paper characterizes robust criteria for comparing socially risky situations from a
normative point of view. The criteria characterized are SEHP and SEPG dominance.
Each of these criteria is shown to coincide with the ranking that commands unanimous
agreement among all VNM social rankings that are anonymous and Pareto inclusive with
respect to a specic wide class of individualistic VNM preferences. While the sequential
expected poverty dominance criteria that we obtained are evocative of two-dimensional
dominance criteria à la Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), they use the ex ante proba-
bilities faced by individuals to weight the poverty assigned to each of them rather than
the ex post frequency of these individuals in the population. As illustrated in our empir-
ical application on the distribution of risks of involuntary unemployment in France and
the US, the dominance criteria are easy to use, and are capable of producing interesting
conclusions. Among other things, it happens that a statistically signicant dominance of
men over women in terms of exposure to risks of involuntary unemployment as per our
criteria is not observed in the US while it is observed in France. This suggests that the
later country can be seen as "more unfair" than the former in terms of its allocation of
risks of involuntary unemployment between men and women.
There are various directions in which the analysis of this paper could be extended.
First, it would be interesting to apply the criteria in a dynamic perspective so as to see
whether the folk impression of a growing exposure of workers to unemployment risks
within countries is indeed plausible. Another interesting extension of the analysis would
be to construct and implement summary indices of risk exposure that would enable a
complete ranking of risky situations in a way that is compatible with their incomplete
ranking provided by the dominance criteria. We believe also the criteria to be potentially
useful to study the theoretical design of normatively appealing systems of unemploy-
ment insurance, in a similar way than the Lorenz criterion is used, in the Jakobsson
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(1976) tradition, to analyze the progressivity of a tax schedule in the context of income
distributions.
Last, but not least, it would be interesting to examine alternative dominance criteria
that could be based on di¤erent assumptions on the properties of the individual state-
dependent preferences. Two properties that are somewhat disputable in the criteria
considered herein are those that assert that the marginal utility of income decreases with
the state (healthy people get less extra pleasure from money than less healthy ones) and
that the degree of absolute risk aversion (as measured by the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient) is
also decreasing with the state. Our preliminary investigations suggest that it is possible to
derive empirical criteria that make the converse assumptions on the impact of the state of
the world on both the marginal utility of income and the decrease in the marginal utility
of income. Pursuing these investigations is a well-worth objective of future research.
A Proofs of theorems 1-2
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
For the rst implication, assume that p %U1 q. Then, the inequality:X
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holds for every function U : 
 I! R in U1. Consider, for any k 2 f1; :::; lg and t 2 I, the
function V kt : 
 I! R dened, for any j 2 
 and y 2 I by:
V kt(j; y) =  1 if y  t and j  k
= 0 otherwise
It can be checked that the function V kt so dened belongs to U1 for any k 2 f1; :::; lg and
t 2 I. Hence, inequality (16) holds for the functions V kt so that we have:X
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as required by (6).
23
For the other implication, consider a subdivision of the interval [0; 1] into r sub-intervals
[h; h+1] for h = 0; :::; r   1 such that:
0 = 0
m = 1
and, for all i 2 N , j 2 
 and y 2 I, there are h and h0 2 f0; 1; :::; rg such that p(i; j; y) = h
and q(i; j; y) = h0 . We this notation, we can write (16) as:
rX
h=1
mX
y=1
lX
j=1
fj(h; y)hU(j; y)  0 (17)
where, for h = 1; :::; r, j = 1; :::l and y = 1; :::;m,
fj(h; y) = #fi 2 N : p(i; j; y) = h g
 #fi 2 N : q(i; j; y) = hg (18)
(we of course allow for the possibility that the cardinality of either of the two sets that enters
in (18) be zero). We now proceed by decomposing the left hand side of (17) using Abel identity
(see for instance (Fishburn and Vickson (1978); eq 2.49)). Doing rst the decomposition with
respect to the y-indexed summation operator yields:
rX
h=1
lX
j=1
[
mX
y=1
fj(h; y)hU(j;m) 
m 1X
t=1
tX
y=1
fj(h; y)h(U(j; t+ 1)  U(j; t))]  0 (19)
Decomposing (19) using Abel identity applied this time to the j-indexed sum operator yields:
rX
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y=1
fj(h; y)h(U(k+1; t+1) U(k+1; t) U(k; t+1)+U(k; t))]  0 (20)
Now, using (18), one can see that that, for every t 2 I and k 2 
 :
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kX
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q(i; j; y) (21)
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Combining this with the fact that:
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we can write (20) as:
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As can be seen, having: X
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X
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for all j 2 
 and all k 2 I is su¢ cient for inequality (22) to hold for all state-dependent utility
functions Uj in U1.
A.2 Proof of theorem 2.
Assume rst that p %U2 q and, accordingly, that inequality (16) holds for all utility functions
U : 
  I ! R in U2. Consider, for any k 2 
 and t 2 I, the function eV kt : 
  I ! R
dened, for j 2 
 and y 2 I, by:
eV kt(j; y) = min(y   t; 0) if j  k
= 0 otherwise
For a given j 2 
, the function eV kt is the "angle" function used in the classical proof of
the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem made by Berge (1959). The reader can verify that the
functions eV kt belong to U2. For this reason the inequality:X
i2N
X
j2

X
y2I
p(i; j; y)eV kt(j; y) X
i2N
X
j2

X
y2I
q(i; j; y)eV kt(j; y) (23)
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holds for every k and t. Using the denition of the functions eV kt, inequality (23) writes:X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
p(i; j; y) min(y   t; 0) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
q(i; j; y) min(y   t; 0)
,X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
p(i; j; y) max(t  y; 0) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
q(i; j; y) max(t  y; 0)
as required by condition (8) of SEPG dominance. To obtain condition (9) of SEPG dominance,
we consider, for every k 2 
, the functions V k: 
 I! R dened, for j 2 
 and y 2 I, by:
V k(j; y) =  1 if j  k
= 0 otherwise
These k-indexed functions clearly satisfy V k(j + 1; y)  V k(j; y) for every y 2 I and j =
1; :::; l 1 and are all (trivially) increasing with respect to income for every j. It can be checked
that these functions satisfy (very often trivially) the conditions imposed on the functions in U2.
Hence, inequality (16) holds for any such functions V k so that we have, for all k 2 
:X
i2N
X
j2

X
y2I
p(i; j; y)V k(j; y) 
X
i2N
X
j2

X
y2I
q(i; j; y)V k(j; y)
or X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
 p(i; j; y) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
 q(i; j; y)
,X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
p(i; j; y) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
q(i; j; y)
as required by condition (9).
For the other implication, it proceeds just as in the proof of theorem 1 by writing inequality
(16) in the form of (17) and by doing the Abel decomposition of (17) until one reaches condition
(20). If one then goes one step further and Abel decomposes each term of (20) with respect to
the inner (y-indexed) term, one obtains:
rX
h=1
[ 
l 1X
k=1
kX
j=1
mX
y=1
fj(h; y)h(U(k + 1;m)  U(k;m))
 
m 1X
t=1
tX
y=1
lX
j=1
fj(h; y)h(U(l; t+ 1)  U(l; t))
+
m 2X
v=1
vX
t=1
tX
y=1
lX
j=1
fj(h; y)h(U(l; v + 2)  2U(l; v + 1) + U(l; v))
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+l 1X
k=1
m 1X
t=1
kX
j=1
tX
y=1
fj(h; y)h(U(k + 1; t+ 1)  U(k + 1; t)  U(k; t+ 1) + U(k; t))
 
l 1X
k=1
m 2X
v=1
(
vX
t=1
kX
j=1
tX
y=1
fj(h; y)h
U2(k; v))]  0 (24)
where:
U
2
(k; v) = U(k + 1; v + 2)  2U(k + 1; v + 1) + U(k + 1; v)
 [U(k; v + 2)  2U(k; v + 1) + U(k; v)]
Noticing that:
mX
h=1
kX
j=1
vX
t=1
tX
y=1
fj(h; y)h =
vX
t=1
[
X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
[p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y)]
=
vX
t=1
(
X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
[p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y)])(t  y)
=
vX
t=1
(
X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
[p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y)])P (t; y)
and remembering equation (21) in the proof of theorem 1, one can write (24) as:
 
l 1X
k=1
(
X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
(p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y))(U(k + 1;m)  U(k;m))
 (
X
i2N
X
j2

X
ym 1
(p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y))P (m  1; y)(U(l;m)  U(l;m  1))
+
m 2X
t=1
(
X
i2N
X
j2

X
yt
(p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y)P (t; y))(U(l; t+ 2)  2U(l; t+ 1) + U(l; t))
+
l 1X
k=1
(
X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
(p(i; j; y) q(i; j; y))P (t; y))(U(k+1; t+1) U(k+1; t) U(k; t+1)+U(k; t))
 
l 1X
k=1
m 2X
v=1
(
X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
(p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y))P (t; y)U2kv )]  0 (25)
For any combination of functions Uj (for j 2 
) belonging to U2, it is su¢ cient for (25) to hold
to have, for all k 2 
: X
i2N
X
jk
X
y2I
(p(i; j; y)  q(i; j; y))  0,
27
and: X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
p(i; j; y)P (t; y) 
X
i2N
X
jk
X
yt
q(i; j; y)P (t; y)  0
for all t 2 I, which is the denition of SEPG dominance.
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